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The secret Downing Street memo
The Sunday Times - Britain | 1 May 2005 | MATTHEW RYCROFT
SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY

DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02

cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell

IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.

This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).

(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.

The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.

On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.

Conclusions:

(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.

(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.

(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.

(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.

(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)

MATTHEW RYCROFT

(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)
Poster comment:
I thank Bret for finding this
it is linked in article he posted about it by former veteran CIA Agent, Ray McGovern
please read Ray McGovern's article on FU Proof Bush Fixed The Facts

it is Ray McGovern's interpretation of what this Memo means

I will read this Memo tomorrow very carefully
I am not willing to take Ray McGovern's interpretation at face value
I want to read this original document myself
because it matters

good night FUers
sweet dreams
c u tomorrow
Love, Palo

Posted 05/05/2005 12:05:16 am CDT by palo verde
[ Reply ]
Category: News
Keywords:
To: All
ok I read it
this is dated July 23, 2002
US had decide to do regeme change by that point

this is the key paragraph regarding White House

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

so it means by July 23 2002 Bush had decided to remove Saddam, and this action would be justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMDs

I accept this as a fact

''C reported on his recent talks in Washington''
with who?
did he speak to Bush personally?
who did he speak to?
this is crucial
or did he speak to George Tenet?
or Rumsfeld?
who?

Ray McGovern alas is determined to place all the onus on Bush, and take the heat off the Agency he served devotedly and idealistically for 27 years

I accept that Bush administraton had decided on regime change before CIA was sent to find the evidence of WMDs
I accept that the decision to justify it to the public as conjunction of terrorism and WMDs
I do not accept that Bush put pressure on CIA to fabricate all the evidence
if CIA had been truthful and told him our evidence shows Saddam does not have WMDs
I think Bush would have switched the justification for regime change to ''terrorism''
the big rub would have been Colin Powell who did not want the war
the CIA had to dupe Colin Powell about WMDs to get him on board
so we do not know how things would have played out if CIA had not fabricated the evidence
would Bush have changed his mind when Colin Powell, Brent Scowcroft, and his dad did not favor the war??
Love, Palo

It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran

The military were continuing to ask lots of questions. For instance, what were the consequences if Saddam used WMD on day one

this shows that Bush and everyone assumed Saddam had WMDs
before the CIA suppressed evidence Saddam had no WMDs
and fabricated the evidence he did
1 Posted 2005-05-05 14:08:58 by palo verde
[ Reply | To 0 ]
To: palo verde
before the CIA suppressed evidence Saddam had no WMDs

No, the Office of Special Plans did that. Their job was to make sure that the truth didn't get out. Otherwise, we might not have been able to attack Iraq, and would have had to concentrate on Afghanistan and killing Osama bin Laden.

The number one priority was to make sure and mindf**k the American public so hard they wouldn't notice that 15 of the terrorists, and almost all the money, came from Saudi Arabia. And, shortly thereafter, W invited the Saudi Prince to Crawford; probably to congratulate him on a job well done.

2 Posted 2005-05-05 14:34:42 by unamused
(Everyone wants freedom. They just don't want it bad enough to let their neighbor have it too. )
[ Reply | To 1 ]

To: unamused

I am sorry Bret but you have not kept up
the articles detailing exactly what the CIA did based on what they testified to when they were forced by subpoena to testify before Congress
were posted on LP
I'll look to see if I made the effort to post any of them on FU while I was still foursquare on LP
If you have not read those articles, then you are not informed
The Office of Special Plans is irrelevant, becuse no one in government paid attention to them
they turned out to be red herring thrown out before the lead-in to war
so we would never know what the CIA was doing
the CIA fabricated all the evidence
and Colin Powell, President Bush, and Congress read the CIA's fabricated evidence and believed it
I'll try to see if I posted at least one of the articles on FU
if it happened at the junction when Todd was first trying to save FU
I might have
if not -- I do not know if the previous forum which was on here posted the articles,
it was something I followed carefully, but not all posters did
Love, Palo

honey there's nothing I can do unless you read those articles of what was released in CIA testimony by CIA agents on oath before Congress
the big fight I had with the posters on LP
we all read those articles together
is the anti-Bush posters agree with Ray McGovern CIA did it because of White House pressure
or to please the White Huse
only I alone said corrupt CIA agents wanted war with Iraq badly for corrupt reasons of their own
and fabricated the evidence on their own
I pointed out Bush fired George Tenet and the other higher-ups at CIA when he discovered they fabricated all the evidence
Ray McGoven does not mention this here
instead he mentions what the posters threw in my face, that Bush gave Tenet the Medal of Freedom Award
my argument was that was a sop after he fired Tenet, so Tenet would not go to war with him
Tenet is tremendously influential in DC

3 Posted 2005-05-05 15:28:17 by palo verde

[ Reply | To 2 ]

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